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The research examines whether anger rather than disgust will be more likely to be 
responsible for changes in moral judgment, after individuals consider potential 
circumstances. Participants first read a scenario that described a moral violation 
(harm/fairness versus purity) and then gave their initial moral judgment and emotions 
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toward the act. They were then asked to list things that could change their opinion and 
were provided with an opportunity to fill out the measures again, re-evaluating the 
scenario with these changes in mind. It was found that ratings of disgust did not 
change after generating potential circumstances; however, anger changed in 
differential ways for the two violation types. We also found that anger but not disgust 
predicted change in moral judgment. These findings suggest that moral anger is a 
more flexible emotion than moral disgust because anger is more likely to respond to 
changes in circumstances.   
 




















Moral Anger Is More Flexible Than Moral Disgust 
 
Legal and moral judgments should, and do, take into account mitigating 
circumstances. For example, juries considering murder cases are often asked to 
consider factors such as the mental capacity of the accused and whether or not he or 
she was acting in self-defense. However, sometimes first impressions “stick” and 
have a lasting influence, being resistant to change and even influencing later reasoned 
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thought (Kunda, 1990).  In this research we test the possibility that judgments of 
moral violations are more resistant to change through second thoughts – that is, less 
flexible - to the extent that they involve disgust rather than anger. 
In support of our flexibility assumption, previous research has identified 
contextual factors that can influence the anger experience; however, to date similar 
effects have not been shown for disgust.  The following factors have been shown to be 
influential on anger: perceptions of strength or resources (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000), perceptions of justice (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999), consequences of 
the act (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007) and relationship with the target (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007; Kuppens, Van Mechelen & Meulders, 2004). Thus, there are 
numerous contextual appraisals which can influence whether anger is experienced in 
the first place, the intensity of anger, and its behavioral consequences.  
By contrast, there is indirect evidence that moral disgust is relatively inflexible 
to contextual changes because disgust is an object-focused emotion (Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988). When disgust is elicited individuals are more likely to focus on a 
concrete judgment of whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred, instead of 
focusing on what is known about the current context. For example, in research on the 
moral dumbfounding phenomenon (Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 2000), participants 
judged a moral violation negatively even though it is described in such a way that 
nobody is harmed and nobody’s rights are violated, and persist in this judgment even 
though they cannot articulate reasons for it. Non-moral disgust, too, seems impervious 
to context; research by Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff (1986) finds that disgust-related 
contagion reactions persist even when an object only looks like something disgusting 
and even when the object is subjected to a context that should rationally purify it. This 
inflexibility to context may come about because disgust often serves as a disease 
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avoidance mechanism, in which it is better to avoid false alarms than to risk coming 
into contact with a contagious agent (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Park, Faulkner 
& Schaller, 2003). Disgust, then, seems oriented toward a more categorical judgment 
of an act or object; it discourages evaluations of the current circumstance, and seems 
to be less responsive to changes in circumstance. 
Recently, we have found that even when controlling for anger and disgust’s 
co-activation in moral contexts, and using variations of the same scenario, anger 
responds to the contextual cues of harm and intent; disgust does not, and only 
responds to whether or not a norm about the use of the body has been violated 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, in press a). Importantly, within this research both anger and 
disgust uniquely contributed to individuals’ moral judgments. We also found that the 
appraisals of harm and intent fully accounted for the relationship between their 
relevant manipulations and anger. In contrast, purity and abnormality appraisals only 
partially accounted for the relationship between the bodily norm violation 
manipulation and disgust. Although suggestive, these results do not completely 
establish that anger is a more contextually flexible emotion than disgust. It could be 
that disgust responds to contextual factors, other than harm and intent, that we did not 
think to manipulate and measure.  
In another line of research, we have found that people give less elaborated 
reasons for their disgust in comparison to anger, particularly in the context of 
justifying disgust toward bodily norm violators (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, in press b). 
When explaining disgust in a sexual context, participants often gave a tautological 
response based on disgust itself, such as, ‘Paedophiles are disgusting because they are 
gross’. Cumulatively, these findings indicate that both anger and disgust are 
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influential to moral judgments; however, different types of appraisals are associated 
with them, which differ in their complexity and flexibility.  
In research on the different principles motivating moral judgment, a 
distinction is made between principles of benevolence, fairness, and rights on the one 
hand, and principles that safeguard the perceived purity of the body and soul on the 
other hand (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Research 
has found that harm and fairness violations are more likely to be associated with 
anger, and purity violations with disgust (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner & Cohen, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Our 
interest is then in both types of violations; because anger and disgust are semantically 
related and share certain cognitive features such as negativity and other-agency, 
people tend to report an appreciable amount of disgust even when anger 
predominates, and vice versa.  
In this experiment, we asked participants to read a scenario that described a 
moral violation. Scenarios described, between participants, two different kinds of 
violation - either a purity violation (sexual or food taboo) or a non-purity violation 
(harm and fairness) - and there were two separate settings in which the violation 
occurred. Participants provided their initial moral judgment and emotions toward the 
behavior. After writing down up to five things that could change their opinion, they 
filled out the measures again, imagining that their hypothetical changes had come 
about.  
Based on our previous findings, we think anger relative to disgust would be 
more likely to change from before to after thinking about the circumstances that could 
change their judgment, particularly when the moral violation predominantly provokes 
anger.  However, disgust is unlikely to change, regardless of the type of violation. 
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Also, we expected changes in anger, rather than disgust, should better predict changes 
in moral judgment.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety seven participants (82 females, 15 males), students at the University of 
Kent between the ages of 18 to 52 (M= 23.41, SD=7.37), completed this experiment. 
Participants were given the chance to win a £50 raffle prize as an incentive for 
participating.  
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 Participants first read one of four scenarios, which were written so that a 
hypothetical person, Joe, performed the behavior. Two of the related scenarios came 
from Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009), supplying one harm violation (a person kicks 
a dog) and a corresponding purity violation (a person eats a dead dog).  The other two 
scenarios were adapted from Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla and Vasiljevic (2010). One 
described a fairness violation - a workplace sexual relationship in which power was 
abused, and the other corresponding scenario involved a sexual purity violation, a 
workplace sexual relationship involving adults with a large age difference between 
them.  
After reading the scenario participants filled out a measure which assessed 
their moral judgment of the behavior on a “completely right” to “completely wrong” 
nine point scale.  Participants also filled out measures of their anger and disgust, 
similar to the measures used in Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007); thus, participants 
gave word ratings for each emotion and rated their endorsement of facial photographs 
showing extreme forms of anger and disgust on separate scales, “not at all” to 
“extremely” nine point scales.   
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After filling out these measures, participants were asked: Is there anything that 
you believe could change your opinion about Joe’s behavior?, using a yes/no 
question. They were then asked to list up to five things that could change their 
opinion. After listing each separate thing, participants were asked whether the thing 
they listed would change something about: “a) The circumstances leading to the 
behavior, b) Joe himself, c) The circumstances during the behavior, d) The 
consequences of Joe’s behavior, e) Something about yourself, f) None of the above” 
(only selecting one of the six options). No major trends were detected in the type of 
things that were written according to participants coding (see results section).  
Participants were then asked to imagine that they were able to change all the 
things they listed, and filled out the moral judgment and emotion measures again, re-
evaluating the scenario with these changes in mind.  The order of measures was 
counterbalanced and there were no significant effects involving order of presentation.  
Data Preparation 
As in previous research, the facial endorsement ratings had their strongest 
correlations with the corresponding emotion word scales, and differences in 
correlations were significant. Therefore, as in Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007) the 
facial endorsement and the word means were both standardized, and then averaged 
together, to create two general measures of anger and disgust at both time points. We 
also calculated difference scores for moral judgment, disgust and anger ratings, 
subtracting time 1 from time 2.  
Results 
Change 
To assess change in opinion, mixed model GLM analyses were carried out 
entering time (before versus after listing) as a within-participant factor; type of 
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violation (harm/fairness versus purity) and setting of scenario (dog versus sexual 
relationship) as between-participants factors. Separate analyses were carried out with 
disgust, anger and moral judgment as dependent variables.  
Disgust. The between-participant effects of type of violation, F(1,90) = 12.78, 
p=.001, partial η2= .12, and setting of scenario, F(1,90) = 39.09, p<.001, partial η2= 
.30,  were significant, but the two-way interaction was not, p=.13. As expected, 
participants were more disgusted by the purity violations (M = 0.25, S.E. = 0.10) than 
the harm/fairness violations (M = -0.24, S.E. = 0.11), and by the dog scenarios (M = 
0.43, S.E. = 0.10) than the sexual relationship scenarios (M = -0.43, S.E. = 0.10). 
None of the within-participants effects were found to be significant, all p>.15 (see 
Figure 1). That is, disgust stayed the same before and after imagining contextual 
changes, no matter what type of moral violation was involved.  
Anger. The effects of type of violation, F(1,90) = 7.87, p=.006, partial η2= .08, 
and setting of scenario, F(1,90) = 41.27, p<.001, partial η2= .31, were significant. 
Again as expected, participants felt more anger towards the harm/fairness violations 
(M = 0.23, S.E. = 0.11) than the purity violations (M = -0.19, S.E. = 0.10), and by the 
dog scenarios (M = 0.49, S.E. = 0.11) than the sexual relationship scenarios (M = -
0.46, S.E. = 0.10). The two-way interaction was also significant, F(1,90) = 11.43, 
p=.001, partial η2= .11. Simple effects analyses revealed that persons felt more anger 
in the dog harm than the dog purity condition, F(1,89) = 18.71, p<.001, partial η2= .17 
(Dog harm: M = 0.95, S.E. = 0.15; Dog purity: M = 0.04, S.E. =  0.15); however, the 
difference between the sexual relationship conditions was non-significant, p=.68 (Sex 
harm: M = -0.50, S.E. = 0.15; Sex purity: M = -0.41, S.E. = 0.15).  
More centrally to our hypotheses, the interaction between time and type of 
violation was significant, F(1,90) = 7.30, p=.008, partial η2= .08 (see Figure 1). 
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Simple effects analyses indicated opposite directions of change in anger within the 
harm/fairness conditions, F(1,90) = 3.67, p=.06, partial η2= .04, and the purity 
conditions, F(1,90) = 3.63, p=.06, partial η2= .04. As expected, anger decreased 
within the harm/fairness conditions; however, within the purity conditions there was 
an increase in anger from initially low levels. No other within-participants effects 
were significant, all p>.28.  
Moral Judgment. The effects of type of violation, F(1,89) = 12.33, p=.001, 
partial η2= .12, and setting of scenario, F(1,89) = 31.04, p<.001, partial η2= .26,  were 
significant; however, the two-way interaction was not, p=.70. Moral judgment was 
more negative within the harm/fairness conditions (M = 6.39, S.E. = 0.27) than within 
the purity conditions (M = 5.07, S.E. = 0.26). Participants thought the dog scenarios 
(M = 6.77, S.E. = 0.27) were more wrong than the sexual relationship scenarios (M = 
4.69, S.E. = 0.26). 
The within-participant effect of time was significant, F(1,89) = 35.37, p<.001, 
partial η2= .28, indicating that participants felt that the behavior was less wrong after 
listing things that could change their opinion, T1: M = 6.46, S.E = 0.19; T2: M = 5.00, 
S.E = 0.25. The interaction between time and type of violation was also significant, 
F(1,89) = 7.81, p=.006, partial η2= .08. Simple effects analyses indicated a much 
larger reduction of wrongness after listing circumstances within the harm/fairness 
conditions, F(1,89) = 36.93, p<.001, partial η2= .29 (T1: M = 7.46, S.E = 0.27; T2: M 
= 5.32, S.E = 0.37), than within the purity conditions, F(1,89) = 5.15, p=.03, partial 
η2= .06 (T1: M = 5.46, S.E = 0.26; T2: M = 4.69, S.E = 0.35).  These results were not 
qualified by interactions with setting of scenario, both p>.10. Moral judgments 
concerning purity violations were thus overall less likely to change than moral 
judgments concerning harm and fairness violations. This is consistent with the lesser 
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flexibility of disgust within each scenario and the stronger feelings of disgust overall 
in purity violations. 
We then conducted a regression analysis across conditions using moral 
judgment difference scores as the DV, entering disgust and anger difference scores as 
predictors. Change in moral judgment was predicted by anger difference scores, β 
=.36, p=.005, not by disgust difference scores, β = .12, p=.36. These results show that 
changes in anger most directly drove the change in moral judgment between the two 
time points.  
Listing Task 
The majority of participants (80%) said that they believed something could 
change their opinion about the morality of the action. In a Setting x Violation Type 
GLM analysis on the amount of statements listed there was only a marginal effect of 
setting of scenario, F(1,93) = 3.22, p=.08, partial η2= .03, in which participants listed 
slightly more things for the sexual relationship scenarios than the dog scenarios (Dog:  
M=1.67, S.E.=0.23; Sex: M=2.25, S.E.=0.23). However, importantly, the main effect 
of type of violation and the two-way interaction were not found to be significant, both 
p>.69. Thus, participants within the different type of violation conditions showed no 
differences in the amount of material that they could come up with.  
We also looked at participants coding of the things they listed, in order to see 
if there were differences in the type of things listed, not just the overall amount. Over 
90 % of participants did not use the “something about yourself” and “none of the 
above” coding categories, thus, they are not included in the analysis. To simplify 
matters we also used the total of both circumstances categories. A mixed model GLM 
analysis was carried out entering coding category totals (circumstances versus himself 
versus consequences) as a within-participant factor; type of violation (harm/fairness 
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versus purity) and setting of scenario (dog versus sexual relationship) as between-
participants factors. The main effect of coding category was significant, F(1,89) = 
31.28, p<.001, partial η2= .25; however, no other effects were significant, all p > .14. 
The means suggested that participants responses mainly focused on the circumstances 
surrounding the norm violation (Circumstances: M= 1.09, S.E. = 0.11; Himself: M= 
0.57, S.E. = 0.08; Consequences: M=0.21, S.E. = 0.05). Therefore, based on this 
analysis the participants did not seem to differ in the type of things that they listed 
within the different conditions.  
Discussion 
In this experiment, anger, but not disgust, was shown to be driving change in 
moral judgment when people generated potential circumstances that could change 
their opinion. People resisted changing their feelings of disgust toward harm/fairness 
violations and purity violations. However, anger showed greater change, although the 
pattern was different for the two violation types. Anger was less severe toward 
harm/fairness violations after participants considered things that could change their 
opinion, but when purity violations were concerned, if anything, there was a slight 
increase in anger, in a backlash effect. This finding can perhaps be interpreted in light 
of previous findings that a purity violation without a harm component (e.g. creating 
and eating a steak from human tissue without hurting anyone, or sexual norm 
violations) nonetheless can evoke some lower amount of anger (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; 
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). We also found that changes in anger scores, not 
disgust, uniquely predicted the change in moral judgment for both types of violations. 
Thus, anger is more responsive than disgust to moral changes of mind.   
Another interpretation of our finding could be that people made different 
inferences from anger in comparison to disgust, and this is why the emotions showed 
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different patterns of change. Fischer and Roseman (2007) found that contempt, an 
emotion similar to disgust, is different from anger in that it implies disapproval of the 
person’s character of disposition rather than action. Our listing manipulation did not 
encourage individuals to make different types of inferences, but instead asked 
participants to come up with anything that could change their opinion we cannot 
determine if this interpretation is influential to our results. However, participants 
coding of their responses does not suggest that this interpretation could account for 
our findings because across all conditions participants were more likely to focus on 
the circumstances, rather that about the individual or consequences.  
One concern about our findings might be based on the finding that responses 
to purity violations were in general less disapproving than responses to harm and 
fairness violations. So, it could be argued that the circumstances people came up with 
could have had different implications for different violations and scenarios. 
Specifically, for a scenario that was overall rated extremely negatively (e.g., kicking a 
dog), circumstances could only make it less wrong, while for one that was overall 
rated in the middle of our moral judgment scale (e.g., sex with a large age difference), 
people might have also come up with circumstances that made the scenario more 
wrong as well. However, the main results relevant to our hypothesis were found 
within scenario, in a design that directly compared anger and disgust responses to the 
same story. So, we think any differences between responses to stories increase the 
generalizability of our main results across different contexts and intensities of moral 
judgment, rather than providing a confound for them.  
In conclusion, this experiment showed that any change in moral judgment, 
after considering potential circumstances, responds to changes in feelings of anger not 
disgust that are associated with the moral judgment. Even when people 
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idiosyncratically listed the most powerful things that could get them to change their 
mind, anger changed more than disgust in response to these novel circumstances, and 
had more to do with changes in moral judgment. This supports our contention that 
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